This case study has a slightly different format to the others in the SEEdesign Library, as it is based on a paper ‘Supporting the research phase of a design project: lessons to share’ given by Jean Schneider at the International Workshop on Design Support (IWDS 2006) held in Cardiff, Wales/UK in May 2006.
The author, Jean Schneider, works for APCI (the Agency for the Promotion of Industrial Creation) where he is in charge of APCI’s European projects. Introduction APCI (Agence pour la Promotion de la Création Industrielle), based in Paris/France, has recently coordinated a programme aiming at sustaining the preliminary research phase of design development in industry. Though the project did not run according to the original scheme, lessons have been drawn from the various success and failures encountered during the process. We believe that some of these insights can be shared by other design support bodies when developing and implementing similar schemes. Objectives of IBC IBC (Innovation dans les Biens de Consommations) was a programme aiming at supporting innovation in the sector of consumer goods. The two year scheme (2002–4) was launched and funded by the French Ministry of Industry. Based on previous research projects, and taking into consideration the claims made by many designers that their creative skills were merely used for solving short-term problems rather then delivering visions, APCI entered an application that focused on supporting the ‘research’ or ‘conceptual’ phase of design projects. In a nutshell, the scheme was devised as an experiment in the fields of consumer or leisure goods, with a financial incentive close to 30.000 euro that would cover up to 50% of the expenses related to the development of a new concept for a product or service, for each of the 15 cases selected. This was intended to demonstrate the value of using design as a tool for ‘envisioning’ strategic orientations for SMEs. The nation’s budgets were frozen right after the application was accepted, and it took almost two years of turmoil before the process could restart, though it was scaled down significantly. Aside from the ‘significant and expected’ cut in the initial budget, some of the main alterations made to the original plan were that the support would go to the design consultancy instead of the company, and that the design–company teams had to be set up very quickly (roughly two weeks, and a maximum of 7 teams), possibly based on existing partnerships. Initially, a seminar and a steering committee were supposed to build the framework for matching the partners up in teams. It became very clear that APCI had little say about the partners, and that our role in the initial selection was limited to evaluating the overall understanding the team partners had of the objectives of the project. The process APCI organized a general meeting with all designers in order to get a deeper knowledge of their approaches, as well as to discuss the role of APCI. Our mission was to guarantee that taxpayers’ money was properly used, and that different scenarios could be developed: APCI’s project managers could act for instance as methodology experts, as supervisors, as project drivers. Looking at the diversity of objectives and projects, and given the budget that was available (which covered roughly half of one man-month of consulting), it was decided to let each case develop in its own environment, and that APCI would ensure that each individual process was in tune with the overall aims of the project. A one day start-up seminar allowed designers and company representatives to get exposure to experts in foresight, advanced design research, and sparked a discussion on each project. Given the fact that the whole intention was to build and disseminate the knowledge gained (the scheme was labelled ‘an experiment’), it was very important to set up from the start a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ on the communication of the work. Designers were clearly unwilling to see their names associated with possible project ‘failures’, whilst companies were eager to ensure that IP would be guaranteed. Following this event, APCI’s project managers visited most of the companies on site, and had discussions with in-house staff, no representative of the design partner being there. This showed that the expectations of the companies were slightly different from what the designers had either formulated or had in mind. The major discrepancies appeared along the split between the ‘long-term’ approach that was implicit in the whole IBC project, and the ‘short-term’ management issues. To put it in management terms, the intention of the scheme was to push design at a strategic level, but projects were in fact dealing with tactical aspects. This led us to reformulate some of the objectives and refine some briefs. APCI also reported back to the ministry, in order to avoid unpleasant criticism, as some projects progressed in unexpected directions. The process was then followed by APCI’s project manager attending design–industry meetings, and interviews. Results As the projects come to an end, the way the process developed has allowed us to make interesting observations that we will use in the future. The seven teams that were selected were very diverse. They ranged from major manufacturers with strong world brands to a single entrepreneur subcontracting all manufacturing; high-tech electronics to classic outdoor games; family-owned businesses to companies belonging to European groups . . . On the other side, the designers’ profiles were much more homogeneous, though some of them had experience of working with open-ended projects for major companies. Nevertheless, and in that respect, the situation in If we review the situation in this concluding phase, we might consider that, out of seven, two are definite failures, whereas the others have had positive results. The reasons that prevented two teams from delivering any result can be broken down to communication and management issues. The meeting between the designers and the branch/factory marketing managers was sparked by the designer willing to get one (their) idea in the production pipeline, and the company trying to get a new concept quickly in the market. One could see there a promising attitude, but the fact is that, even though they had been in discussion with the company for a long time, the designers could never get the projects started. This detail should have rung an alarm bell: the grant attached to the project was somehow seen as an incentive by the company management to get in some innovation at a reduced cost. Both companies belonged to larger groups, and it turned out that the branch had little, if any, support from the top management to invest much into research (prototypes, tooling, etc.). This prevented projects from developing at all: one team did not finalize the contract, while the other ended up after a few months with the designer and the company management ending their collaboration. In both cases, designers did not pay attention to the gap between their goodwill and the companies’ latent expectations. This epitomizes what we somehow sense as a critical factor in the collaboration between designers and companies: when complaining about the lack of ‘interest’ of companies for innovative designs, designers seem to underestimate the complex expectations of the business. Another team stopped midway. Driven by the success of a previous collaboration that opened up new markets, the company (a very small one) decided to focus on objects designed to improve senior citizens’ life in their own home. There was an opportunity to use ethnographical methods, and develop a comprehensive approach to comfort, usability, etc.: a true showcase for the ‘power of design’. But the company went out of business, for two main reasons: in that field, the distribution channels are very difficult to enter. Paramedical outlets were avoided because they associate negative connotations to products (ageing=handicap), and DIY retailers need to be educated about the specific requirements of ageing citizens. Moreover, regulations have a tremendous impact on market solvency. If a country’s healthcare system decides to support some of the expenses attached to adapting an interior for senior citizens, then the scale of the market expands. On the design side, it proved very difficult to tackle in depth psychological issues, which might not be conveyed with enough sensitivity by the literature. The other teams have managed well. In three cases, the first key factor was the strong commitment of both parties. This is certainly well known from the literature on innovation but it is interesting to spot the ground on which it worked. Two teams had a history of successful collaboration, and had built trust. Therefore, embarking on a longer and more adventurous project was seen as a constructive break from the routine: the social dimension of the project (words like game, pleasure, fun were mentioned) was as important as the business issues, which were there as well. In addition, the companies had an excellent knowledge of their position in the market and of their distribution networks, and good control of the production process. This was an asset for at least one of them, as it could get the first idea almost bought before it was drafted. The third team benefited from the limits experienced from qualitative market studies and from the strong commitment of the in-house design manager. This created a window of opportunity that allowed the external design consultancy to bring in new perspectives awaited by the management. Moreover, the design consultancy looked for complementarity, and broadened the issue to create a network of companies that could share a global study on the future of travel. This move created a set of stakeholders that are willing to pay for in-depth research, and might even drive new concepts of services or products through cross-fertilization. It is too early yet to see the results, but the effectiveness of the approach is a lesson to consider. Conclusions Looking at the history of the project, some conclusions can be made. Though the project was focusing on innovation, some factors are probably relevant to many design support schemes. Success requires trust between the two partners, and trust takes time and sensitivity to build up. What the project highlighted was that, to venture into new territories, it is better to have a good partner than an accurate map: in other words, design is not a simple service with measurable input–output factors, and cannot be treated as such. This ‘unpredictability’ is in line with other studies. Foresight is not ‘product design’ or wild concepts. Its value does not lie in fantasies, but rather in a creative way of tweaking existing realities to make more desirable futures happen (for that matter, a company’s future). Therefore, realistic resources and objectives can be committed, and the shift between tactical and strategic management issues is less noticeable, and therefore critical. It is very clear that the current time frame for decision making inside companies is becoming shorter, and that a two-year perspective is ‘far fetched’. There is a need for some tool or method to evaluate the capacities, resources, strategy and management of a company that wants to invest in new product/service development. The time span, the risks and the ultimate decisions lie with the company and its management. Being able to assess the capabilities for innovation is a strength. On the other hand, it must be said that the design discourse still delivers a ‘red-cross’ message to companies, by saying that design can solve problems. This is in line with the more general discourse that conveys a message of fear: ‘innovate or perish’. This is not the place to extensively analyze the reality of the threat, nor who benefits from such messages. Still, given the current situation, designers seem to be called in rather late, and therefore in situations where virtually no resources can be allocated to new product development. Having more insights on designers’ skills and approaches to industry would be also an asset. What could be remembered then is that new product development and innovation should be undertaken when the company goes well: it is too risky and too expensive to run when in a crisis. This case study reflects the views of its author, and not necessarily the views of APCI. For further information about this programme, please contact Jean Schneider (jn.sr@free.fr or info@apci.asso.fr)

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